Poland’s Prime Minister Donald Tusk has sparked a debate about the future of European security by suggesting that his country should consider its own nuclear deterrent. Addressing Poland’s parliament on March 7, 2024, Tusk argued that the “profound change of American geopolitics” has forced Europe to rethink its defense strategies.
His comments come amid growing uncertainty over U.S. security commitments to NATO, particularly due to former U.S. President Donald Trump’s statements questioning the alliance’s reliability. While Tusk clarified that Poland is not immediately seeking nuclear weapons, he emphasized that the road to such a decision would be “very long” and require “a consensus.”
According to The Economist, Germany’s Friedrich Merz, expected to become the country’s next chancellor, has called for talks with Britain and France about “supplementing the American nuclear shield.” Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron recently announced a “strategic debate” on using France’s nuclear deterrent to protect its European allies.
The Fragile State of Nuclear Deterrence in Europe
For nearly 80 years, Europe has relied on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter potential adversaries. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has structured its security policy around this extended deterrence, with American nuclear weapons stationed in several European countries.
Yet, extended deterrence has always been a delicate balance. The credibility of a U.S. nuclear response hinges on Washington’s willingness to risk nuclear conflict to defend its allies. To reinforce this commitment, the U.S. has maintained a large nuclear arsenal and forward-deployed weapons in Europe.
Britain, despite its relatively small nuclear force, has assigned its arsenal to NATO’s collective defense strategy. However, the ultimate decision to use these weapons remains with the British Prime Minister.
France has historically maintained a more independent stance. It withdrew from NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and has consistently prioritized national sovereignty over its nuclear arsenal.
According to Emmanuelle Maitre of the Foundation for Strategic Research in Paris, France’s position is rooted in a desire to “keep options open for the president” rather than be constrained by alliance commitments.
Despite this, French leaders have hinted that their nuclear deterrence has a ‘European dimension.’ In 1995, Britain and France issued a joint statement affirming that “the vital interests of one could not be threatened without the vital interests of the other equally being at risk.”
A similar phrase was included in the 2019 Franco-German Aachen Treaty, suggesting a broad but unspecified commitment to European security.
Poland’s Nuclear Ambitions: A Push for Shared Control
Tusk’s remarks have intensified the debate over how far France is willing to extend its nuclear protection. In a recent press conference, the Polish leader questioned the practicalities of France’s deterrence, stating:
“I would like to know, first of all, in detail what it means in terms of power to use these weapons… If we were to decide on this, it would be worth making sure it is in our hands, and we make the ultimate decisions.”
His comments suggest Poland may seek a greater role in decision-making regarding Europe’s nuclear security—an idea that clashes with France’s strict control over its arsenal.
The proposal echoes historical efforts to establish a shared European nuclear force. During the 1950s and 1960s, NATO explored the Multilateral Nuclear Force (MLNF), which envisioned a fleet of submarines and ships armed with nuclear missiles and operated by multinational crews.
Later, the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) proposed a similar structure under international command. However, these initiatives failed due to political and logistical challenges.
France’s Role in the Future of Europe’s Nuclear Security
Macron has firmly rejected any suggestion of shared nuclear control. He recently reaffirmed that France’s deterrent is “sovereign and French from start to finish”, stating:
“The decision to use nuclear weapons has always been, and will always be, up to the president and commander-in-chief of France.”
Despite this, experts suggest that France could play a more active role in European nuclear deterrence through other means. Peter Watkins, a former British defense official, has proposed that France could join NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) as an observer—a move that would increase transparency without compromising its sovereignty.
Another approach could involve enhancing allied participation in French nuclear exercises. Macron previously invited European allies to “associate” with French nuclear drills, and in 2022, an Italian tanker refueled French aircraft during a nuclear training exercise. According to sources familiar with ongoing discussions, more allies are now expressing interest in participating.
Could France Replace the U.S. As Europe’s Nuclear Protector?
France’s nuclear strategy relies on two key components:
- Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), which provide a strategic deterrent against large-scale threats.
- Air-launched nuclear missiles, which can serve as a “final warning” before escalating to full-scale nuclear retaliation.
The United States currently stations around 180 nuclear bombs across Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. These weapons remain under U.S. control, but allied air forces are trained to deliver them in a crisis.
Some analysts, such as Bruno Tertrais, have proposed a similar model for France, where nuclear-capable Rafale fighter jets could be rotated through Eastern European air bases to signal solidarity with frontline states. However, this idea faces technical and political challenges, particularly regarding whether France is willing to risk escalation with Russia.
For Britain, the situation is even more complex. Unlike France, its nuclear program is deeply intertwined with the U.S. British nuclear warheads are designed to fit American-built Trident missiles, and the missile tubes in Britain’s submarines are identical to those in America’s Columbia-class submarines.
If a future U.S. administration cut off nuclear cooperation, Britain would struggle to maintain its deterrent. Experts suggest one possible solution: reviving a Franco-British nuclear partnership. Such a proposal was floated in the 1970s and 1980s, with discussions over a joint cruise missile program, but never materialized.
